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Joery Matthys. Private Security Companies and Private Military Companies: A
Comparative and Economical Analysis. Antwerp: Maklu, 2010.

The well-documented roles of Blackwater 1 in Iraq and Executive Outcomes in
Sierra Leone in the last fifteen years have given the involvement of private actors in the
provision of security a rather negative image. Critical voices argue that lines of
accountability have become blurred, and critics of private security companies deplore the
strong ties that many private companies have with the oil and mineral extraction sector,
as was perhaps most famously illustrated in the 2008 Hollywood blockbuster Blood
Diamond. This private sector involvement has been described by some leading scholars
as a form of corporate mercenarism. (As suggested by the rather disdainful nod to such
infamous characters as ‘Mad’ Mike Hoare and Bob Denard by some critics, it would be
euphemistic to claim that private security companies (PSCs) and their military
counterparts (PMCs) are not regarded fondly.) More generally, the industry’s short-term
focus on profit is seen as incompatible with the public need for sustainable safety and
security.
In his doctoral dissertation, Private Security Companies and Private Military
Companies: A Comparative and Economical Analysis, Joery Matthys takes issue with
this negative image of PSCs. By pointing out that many elements of security provision
have already been privatized in Western jurisdictions, he successfully demonstrates that
the doomsday scenarios drafted by left-leaning scholars commonly fail to accord to
reality. He takes his point even further, however, by arguing in favor of a new regulatory
framework within which state interference is kept to an absolute minimum, and which
concomitantly allows for greater market influences in the delivery of both security and
military services.
In order to substantiate his argument, Matthys conducts a comparative analysis of the
legal situation in Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States from the vantage
point of the Law and Economics movement. In chapter two, he summarizes the main
tenets of this academic model, which sprang up at the University of Chicago in the 1950s,
and the essence of which is the application of economic methods to legal studies, a notion
seemingly paradoxically inspired by both utilitarian and Marxist thinking. While
adherents of the Law and Economics movement are not all in unanimous agreement, they
are united in their reliance upon the same theoretical assumptions and methodological
practices that underlie neoclassical economics.
The author proves himself an able explicator of terms such as methodological
individualism, the Coase theorem, and rational choice, as well as an illustrator of the
differences between the different schools of thought within the movement. It is in
particular when he addresses the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard that
Matthys manages the academic legerdemain of enlightening the economics novices while
not offending more advanced readers by presenting them with simplistic, caricature-like
descriptions. With this, the groundwork has been laid for the economic analysis of
security laws, as Matthys frequently invokes these concepts throughout his dissertation.

1

Blackwater was renamed as Xe Services in February 2009.
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In the next chapter, Matthys employs an economic perspective to describe the
development of the public police force and how an overhaul of the system is long
overdue. Public security provision may have been the most rational solution in the
eighteenth century, but now, arguably, transaction costs are lower, the Tragedy of the
Commons can be avoided, and free-rider problems can be overcome. It therefore seems
only logical to the author that parts of the six main functions of the police force 2 be
privatized. Matthys freely acknowledges, however, that some groups in society might not
be able to afford private security (p. 58), but he considers this a “separate discussion.”
Problematically, this artificial distinction between the social and the economic is not only
argued unconvincingly, but also hints at academic immorality. In concluding the chapter,
Matthys even claims that the unlucky few that fall outside of the system will simply
“have to rely on charity” (p. 72). With this comment, he sets the scene for the rest of the
book, within which he often manages to provokingly blur the boundary between politics
and academia.
In Chapter 4, the author applies the rationale of the Law and Economics
movement to the legal situation pertaining to private security companies in Belgium, the
UK, and the US. Legal students will be sure to appreciate the comprehensive way in
which Matthys disentangles the myriad of laws, definitions, and systems that govern the
private security industry in the respective jurisdictions. This attention to detail will be lost
on those that are less interested or versed in legal studies, who might perceive the
national breakdowns as dense and prolix, and who would be well-advised to skip ahead
to the comparative analysis. In this, Matthys surprisingly mostly 3 treats the US as a
monolith, after having acknowledged that the lion’s share of laws applying to PSCs is
decided upon at the state level. Consequently, following his ambiguously chosen
American comparison of New York, California, and Texas, the author justifiably
concluded that there is “no real uniformity in regulation” in the US (p. 107). It is thus
scarcely fathomable how Matthys can credibly compare and contrast ‘the’ US to two
other countries in the rest of the chapter.
Notwithstanding the observation that the similarities among the legal systems of
all three countries outnumber their differences, the author’s grounding in the Economics
and Law Movement leads him to favor the British system because it is the least likely to
overburden the sector with redundant, competition-stifling regulations. Matthys is
particularly scathing in his critique of the Belgian civil law framework, which he sees as
lacking transparency, accountability, and cost-efficiency. Overall, however, all three
jurisdictions are seen as rife with entry barriers and other methods of market distortion
purposely put into place by budget-maximizing bureaucracies and already active
companies, who want to prevent new players from entering the market. In short, he says,
competition has been nipped in the bud across the board.
In order to remedy this inefficient status quo, Matthys puts forward a number of
libertarian policy recommendations related to contractual obligations, citizen’s arrest
laws, and liability laws. He offers both an ideal-type scenario within which state
interference has practically entirely been eliminated, and a more politically feasible and
pragmatic approach that balances the government-steered need for quality control with
2

These six functions are: the maintenance of public order, general deterrence and prevention, consultancy,
security, investigation, and information gathering.
3
With the exception of p. 180, where Matthys explicitly refers to interstate differences.
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the ability of the market to mature freely and healthily. This line of reasoning is then
extended to private military companies in Chapter 5. Matthys contends that the
distinction between PSCs and PMCs is a flawed one because they are treated the same by
law and because they are functionally similar. Given its short length and sole focus on the
United States, this chapter seemingly serves mostly as an afterthought that enables the
author to continue advocating privatization on the basis of policy recommendations that
have been inspired by libertarianism and that center on the nature and content of
contracting.
If the preceding chapter constituted an afterthought, Matthys well and fully
digresses in Chapter 6, in which he returns to the conversation about domestic security
and attempts to develop a novel construction by proposing an integrated security and
insurance contract. Not only does the author himself readily admit that such a
comprehensive approach is likely to require both a legal and practical utopia, the
connection to the comparative economic-legal analysis seems labored at best.
Overall, the main strength of this dissertation lies in its well-developed and detailed
exposé of the legal situation in the respective jurisdictions. Matthys’ theoretical overview
of the Law and Economics movement is the book’s other main achievement. However,
whenever he strays from the factual, a sharp drop can be observed in the quality of his
analysis. The arguments lose their academic rigor to the point that the author’s case reads
more like a libertarian manifesto than a scientific application of a theoretical framework
to the provision of security and military services. As the most striking case in point, the
author does himself no favors by borrowing from anarcho-capitalism in likening
conscription to slavery (p. 210). When such overtly political statements are coupled with
a sometimes unfortunate and borderline populist way of phrasing his sentiments (e.g.
when he derides state for naturally holding back markets), Matthys runs the risk of
alienating anyone who does not share his political philosophy but is nonetheless
interested in a legal-economic analysis of PSCs and PMCs. The dissertation also does not
seem to have been properly edited, resulting, among other things, in the misspelling of
household names such as Niccolò Machiavelli and Paul Bremer, the consistent
interchanging of ‘then’ and ‘than,’ and the inelegant ‘economical’ of the book’s title.
This further detracts from the credibility and quality of an analysis that otherwise has a
strong foundation in theory and facts. In short, the style, structure, and explicitly political
angle of Private Security Companies and Private Military Companies leave an
unnecessary and disappointingly unsavory aftertaste.
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